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Abstract 
 
European colonialism had two key economic aspects: the extraction of colonial 
wealth by colonizers, and the relevance of trade for colonial economies. I build a 
simple model of colonialism which puts these two elements at centre stage. By 
controlling policy in the colony, the colonizer can appropriate part of her wealth; the 
colony, however, can stage a successful revolution at a stochastic cost. I assume there 
is some exogenous, non-contractible policy gain from independence, so that the 
colonizer is forced to concede it when the cost of revolution is low. I incorporate this 
mechanism in a three-country, Heckscher-Ohlin model where countries (the 
colonizer, the colony and a third independent country) can decide whether to trade 
with each other, and the colonizer can threaten to stop trading with the colony if she 
rebels. Thus, the attractiveness of revolution and the sustainability of colonial power 
come to depend on the capacity of the colony to access international markets against 
the will of the colonizer which, in turn, depends on the distribution of world factor 
endowments. I present historical evidence in support of my theory. My results have 
important implications for the debate on the economic legacy of colonialism. 
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1 Introduction
One of the striking political and economic changes of the twentieth century
was the almost complete elimination of colonial power. This has naturally
precipitated a large debate about the legacy of colonialism for contemporary
development experiences. This has been invigorated recently among econo-
mists by the empirical study by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001)
linking settler mortality to current prosperity.
To understand the legacy of colonialism, it is important to understand
the forces that led to its rise and decline. This paper studies one central
aspect of this - the inuence of trade. The paper begins from the observation
that trade between colonial states and colonizer was at the centre of colonial
relationships and a source of benet to the colonial power. But this must be
seen in the context of a global equilibrium that shapes alternative sources of
trading opportunities open to the colony, which, in turn, shape the incentive
to rebel and hence the sustainability of colonial power. The paper sets up
a model to make these ideas precise and then relates it to the experience
of decolonization in some parts of the world. It argues that the economic
forces (mainly factor endowments) that shaped the pattern of trade are key
to understanding the historical experience.
Colonialism took many institutional and economic forms. However, one
characteristic that, with varying intensity, was common to all European em-
pires, was the importance of trade for colonial relationships. Soon after
conquest, colonies were forced or encouraged to orientate their production
towards tradable goods that could be consumed in the mother country, or
sold on international markets. In some cases, these products had been pro-
duced by colonies for long time before; in others, a brand new production
was implanted by colonizers, both under public and private initiative.1 Even
though, sometimes, portions of colonial population were forced to partici-
pate in this production, there were normally colonial groups that beneted
from it. Thus, production resulted in trade for the colony, that is it gener-
ated exports (mainly agricultural commodities and raw materials) that were
exchanged in Europe for imports (mainly manufactured goods). The result
of this process was that by the time of decolonization, important segments
of colonial populations were dependent on international trade for their well
being.
1An example of the rst case is Peruvian and Mexican gold and silver, which the Incas
and the Aztecs had produced for centuries before the arrival of the Spaniards. An example
of the second case is sugar plantations, that the Portuguese imported in the Azores and
Brazil.
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A second key feature of European colonialism was the extraction of colo-
nial wealth by colonizers. As I just mentioned, there existed institutions of
forced labour that made sure that only a few groups, in the colonies, bene-
ted from trade. In general, however, institutions and tools were in place that
redistributed part of the value of colonial trade from colonies to colonizers.
These tools can be grouped in four broad categories: beside the institutions
of forced labour, taxes, monopolies on investment, production and trade, and
the allocation of public revenues to appropriately selected public goods.
Moving from these observations, I build a model which concentrates on
the redistributive issue which led to decolonization. On one hand, controlling
de jure political power in the colony, the colonizer can extract and appro-
priate part of the colonys wealth. On the other hand, the colonized have
some de facto political power in that they are able to stage a successful
revolution at some stochastic cost. When the de facto political power of
the colonized is high, the colonizer can only avoid a revolution by reducing
extraction or by conceding independence. I assume that there is some exoge-
nous, non-contractible policy gain from independence, so that the colonizer
has to concede it when the de facto political power of the colonists is high
enough. I incorporate this political economy model into a three-country,
Heckscher-Ohlin trade model where countries (the colony, the colonizer and
a third independent country) decide whether to trade with each other, and
the colonizer is assumed to be able to credibly threaten not to trade with a
colony if she rebels. Thus, the colonys well being after revolution depends on
her capacity to access international markets against the wish of the colonizer,
and so does the sustainability of colonial power. In the model, both these
elements come to depend on the distribution of world factor endowments.
I present a series of case studies to establish whether decolonization and
the distribution of world factor endowments were connected in the way the
model predicts. First, I study the decadence of the colonial power of Spain
in 1590-1750, its temporary revival in 1750-1810, and its nal collapse after
1810. I then study the process which led Britain to concede self-government
to her settler colonies of Canada and Australia in mid 19th century. In both
cases, I nd substantial evidence in favour of my argument.
My paper di¤ers from previous work on decolonization in that it addresses
unanswered questions using an original, formal framework. A vast literature
in history, political science and law can be distilled into three main views.
First, some authors emphasize the role played by nationalist movements in
inducing the colonizers to concede independence. According to these authors,
the reason why nationalist movements gained strength was that colonial pow-
ers treated colonies too harshly (Lynch, 1973; McMinn, 1979; Grimal, 1978).
Second, other authors argue that there were factors within colonizing coun-
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tries that made colonialism unattractive to domestic interests groups and
constituencies (Shuler, 1945; Holland, 1985). Finally, some authors empha-
sise international factors, such as the diplomatic activity of Britain and the
United States in early 1800s or the rise of anti-imperial powers after World
War II (Kaufmann, 1951; McIntyre, 1977). Most of this literature does not
study economic incentives explicitly, and none describe them in a formal way.
Furthermore, a few important questions seem to remain on the ground: why
would colonizers be treating colonies too harshly? Why would this lead
to decolonization at that specic point in time? And how exactly, if in any
way, did international factors shape the incentives of colonies to ght for
independence?
A few papers in economics have attempted to bridge this gap. Grossman
and Iygun (1993) model optimal colonial investment by the colonizer as a
function of the technology of production and rebellion, and derive a set of
conditions under which it is optimal to abandon the colony. Grossman and
Iygun (1997) argue that population growth increased the private returns to
rebellion, thus leading to decolonization in Africa and South Eastern Asia
after World War II. None of these papers, however, consider how economic
incentives were shaped by current and perspective trade conditions.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of
the economics of colonialism, and introduces my argument. Section 3 devel-
ops the model which makes my argument precise. Section 4 presents some
historical evidence in support of my model. Section 5 concludes.
2 Colonialism, trade and extraction
European colonialism kicked o¤ in XV century with the Portuguese explo-
ration of the African coasts and the sea route to the East Indies, and strongly
accelerated with the Spanish discovery of the Americas. In 17th century, the
power of the early colonizers was eclipsed by the rising of France and, slightly
later, the Netherlands and England. A long series of wars (1652-1763) left
the latter as the most powerful colonial power, particularly after control over
India was established in mid 1700s. After a period that could be said of anti-
imperialism - it witnessed the American Revolution of 1776, the independence
wars of Latin America in 1810-1830, and the concession of self-government
to several British settler colonies in the second half of 19th century - the
imperialist momentum slowly built up again,2 to eventually accelerate with
2E.g., the "Great Game" between Britain and Russia for the control of Central Asia
and the defence of India; the creation of a second French empire in North Africa and
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the "Scramble for Africa" and the division of China and the Middle East
in areas of inuence. By the 1930s, European colonialism had reached its
largest expansion ever.
Despite its long and complex history, two economic characteristics of
European colonialism remained remarkably constant over time. The rst
is the importance of trade between colonies, their colonizers and the rest of
the world. In the case of many colonies, trade was the purpose of military
action from the very beginning. For example, England rst deployed troops
in the Indian ocean to protect the monopoly and trade posts of the East India
Company; and when administrative control over Indian states was established
in mid 18th century, this was done at the hands of the Company itself. In
other colonies, where there was an abundance of mineral wealth, the rst
military campaigns were targeted at exacting tribute, if not at stealing and
plundering; but normally, this phase was over quite rapidly. This is the case
of the Spanish Empire, where the conquistadores rst fought and plundered,
then became feudal lords who produced for European markets while paying
tribute to the Crown.
In fact, colonization was normally followed by a major restructuring of
colonial economies. Europeans were interested in exploiting the capacity of
colonies to produce goods that could be consumed in Europe. Sometimes,
this simply required boosting pre-existing industries: for example, in late
16th century the Spaniards organized the Latin American economy around
the production of Peruvian and Mexican silver, which the Incas and the
Aztecs had produced long before their arrival. In India, in the rst part of
18th century, the export of calicoes to Europe was strongly encouraged. In
other cases, brand new productions were imported and established: this is
the case of the sugar plantations implanted by the Portuguese in the Azores
and Brazil in 16th century, or the merino sheep that the British settlers of
Australia grazed after 1810. Throughout the history of colonialism, Euro-
peans became accustomed to consume or process many other commodities
that were produced in colonies, and exchanged for manufacture goods in
Europe: examples are co¤ee, tobacco, indigo, cotton, wool, timber, etc.
Of course, not all participants in this trade had freely chosen to be so.
There were cases in which trade between colonies and colonizers was on
an entirely voluntary basis, such as for the so-called British "pure" settler
colonies of New England, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. More fre-
quently, however, there was a share of colonial population who was forced
to work at the production of export commodities and did not obtain any
part of the value created. It was the case of the Indians who worked the
Indochina.
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mines and farms of the descendents of the Spanish conquistadores, or the
black slaves who for centuries worked the plantations of North America, the
Caribbeans and Brazil. In between these two extremes, lie the case of 19th
and XX century colonies: by that time forced labour had been abolished, but
the African and Asian working classes who produced for the export market
were often faced with monopsonistic labour markets where they had no real
choice but to accept the very little they received. If one abstracts from the
specic institutional arrangements at the base of production, however, it is
clear that an element of voluntary exchange was always in place: at least,
the colonial elite was part of it.
Turning to some data, one can persuade himself of the importance of
trade for the economy of colonies and colonial empires by looking at the
structure of trade patterns for England in 1661-1774, the period in which
the country ascended to the status of worlds leading colonial power. By
the end of this period, there were two main colonial markets for England:
the colonies of North American and the Caribbean to the West, and India
to the East.3 For the former, one nds that the share of the American
colonial market in English imports of foodstu¤ increased from an already
signicant 37% in 1663-1669 to 54% in 1722-1724 and 62% in 1772-1774. For
raw materials, these data were 6%, 15% and 19% respectively. At the same
time, the share of America in English exports of manufactures rose from 9%
in 1663-1669, to 18% in 1722-1724 and 47% in 1772-1774 (Davis, 1954 and
1962).4 As for the Indian market, one nds that the share of English import
of manufactures coming from India increased from 17% in 1663-1669 to 32%
in 1722-1724 and 37% in 1772-1774. Much of this trade was entrepot trade:
in 1772-1774, 72% of all imports of foodstu¤ from America were made up of
sugar and tobacco: around 46% of the cost of these imports was recovered
by re-exporting those commodities to continental Europe. Over the same
period, calicoes represented 88% of imports of manufactures from India: the
value of re-export of calicoes amounted to as much as 100% of the cost of
imports.
The second key characteristic of the economy of colonialism was the ex-
traction of colonial wealth by colonizers. Because of the reforms described
3During the period under consideration, British colonial power expanded in both mar-
kets. In North America and the Caribbean, a series of wars with the French yielded
Canada and islands such as Martinique and Guadeloupe. In India, the rst half of XVIII
century was the period in which the East India Company established direct administrative
rule over many Indian states.
4Data for 1661-1667 are for London only, but the same author shows that, for the
period 1700-1702, 80% of all english imports and 62% of all english exports passed through
London.
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above, production in many colonies became extremely valuable to Europeans.
Colonizers used their control of de jure political power in the colonies to re-
distribute this value to their own advantage. Redistribution, normally, had
two distinct groups of beneciaries. On one hand, the share of value that re-
mained in the colonies was redistributed in favour of a small local elite. This
was either made up of European settlers, or was an indigenous allied elite
that, in some cases, had existed before colonization.5 A notable exception
to this pattern were the British pure settler colonies mentioned above, were
the predominance of European settlers in the population favoured the estab-
lishment of a more meritocratic society, at least after some point. On the
other hand, a consistent share of the value produced was redistributed from
colonies to colonizers. The subjects who beneted from this redistribution
were di¤erent in di¤erent colonizers, but included governments, investors,
consumers and tax payers in general.6
The tools used to redistribute the wealth of the colonies were many, and
can be classied into four broad categories. First, there existed the above
mentioned institutions of forced labour, that made sure that the colonial
labour received the smallest possible share of the value created. Second,
various types of taxes on production, consumption and trade were collected
by colonial or imperial authorities. Third, monopolies over various segments
of the trade lines were set up. Examples include the marketing boards of
British West Africa, who acted as monopsonistic buyers of colonial produce,
or the various "Companies of the Indies" to which European governments
gave exclusive right of trade with the Indies. Also, independently on their
internal structure, trade lines remained for centuries subject to "national
monopolies". These required all commodities coming from the colonies to be
trans-shipped through the colonizer, whatever their destination. Similarly, all
colonial imports had to pass through the colonizer, rst.7 Finally, the public
revenues that remained in the colonies were sometimes used to nance public
goods that were mainly of interest to colonizers. For example, the Indian
army gave a decisive contribution in many of the wars fought by the English
in 19th century, and the Australians paid the bill of British jails for many
5In some cases, colonizers established their rule without toppling the leadership of the
pre-existing polities. This is typically the case of the so-called protectorates.
6There were of course cases in which this second type of redistribution was negative,
or the colonizer paid aid to the colonies: for example, this was the case of the Australian
colonies before the pastoral boom of the 1820s. In the vast majority of cases, however,
redistribution was non-negative.
7Famous examples are the Spanish monopoly over Latin American (which lasted from
late 1500s to early 1800s) and the British Navigation Laws (from 1651 to 1822), but each
colonizer had its own arrangements.
7
years.
A more subtle form of exploitation, the existence of which has been the-
orized rst by Dependency Theorists (see, for example, Dos Santos, 1970,
or Frank, 1971) is the manipulation of factor endowments to the purpose
of alimenting trade-related extraction. According to this view, the colonizer
prevented her colonies from developing their economy in the "right" way by
inducing them to produce foodstu¤ and raw materials for export. This max-
imised imperial trade ows, and the prot from manipulating the terms of
trade in the way described above. While dependency theories are criticised
by most contemporary scholars, there is much historical evidence that spon-
taneous forms of industrialization in the colonies were forcefully interrupted
by the colonizer (see for example Frank, 1971).8
Whether their factor accumulation went to the detriment of "right" eco-
nomic development or not, many colonies came to be dependent on trade
with the colonizer for their prosperity. This dependency was particularly in-
tense for colonies who produced mainly for the market of the mother country,
and consumed mainly goods who could be better supplied by producers of
the mother country. In such colonies, an inuential, if not vast, class of pro-
ducers, consumers and merchants came to see the maintenance of peaceful
trade relations with the colonizer as a priority. Enjoying access to often huge
imperial markets, the colonizer could exercise her de jure political power over
individual colonies from a position of advantage. And when colonies rebelled
(such as, in the British case, did the Thirteen Colonies in 1776 or North
Rhodesia in 1960), the colonizer did not hesitate to retaliate by denying the
rebel access to imperial markets (or, at least, the preferential access they
previously enjoyed).
3 The model
This section is divided in three subsections: 3.1 and 3.2 present, respectively,
the economic model and the political model; 3.3 puts the two building blocks
together and studies the equilibrium.
3.1 Economic model
8In a companion paper (Bonfatti, 2007) I am reviewing such evidence, as well as trying
to put these theories in a more formal framework.
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The economic model is simple Heckscher-Ohlin model of trade. There are
three countries, H, F and E. CountryH is a colony, country F her colonizer,
and country E a third country external to the colonial relation.9
3.1.1 Environment
Each country is inhabited by agents with unit mass. Endowments of labour
(L) and capital (K) are
LH = 1 KH = K
LE = 1 KE = K (1 + )
LF = 1 KF = K (1 + )
where ;  > 0: in words, I am assuming that both F and E are more
capital intensive than H. All citizens own exactly one unit of labour, and
citizens in each country own an equal share of capital.10
Two goods are produced and consumed, x and y. Production technologies
are equal across countries:
x = L (1)
y = K
Similarly, preferences are equal across countries and are described by the
utility function
uiJ = u
 
xiJ ; yiJ

=
 
xiJ
 1
2
 
yiJ
 1
2 (2)
9One should think of F as representing the colonizer and the rest of her empire, and of
E as the rest of the world :
10Notice that I will assume  and  to be exogenous on policy. For a discussion of
the problems that this assumption may pose, see Section 4; for a brief description of the
literature on colonialism and endogenous factor endowments, see Section 2.
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where iJ denotes citizen i in country J . Given that citizens within each
country have homogeneous preferences and endowments, they will all have
the same demand schedule: we can thus drop the upper script i from now
on.11
Uncompensated demand functions and indirect utility are easily found:
xJ
 
pJ

=
1
2
+
KJ
2pJ
yJ
 
pJ

=
pJ
2
+
KJ
2
vJ
 
pJ

=
pJ +KJ
2 (pJ)
1
2
(3)
where pJ  pJx
pJy
is the price ratio faced by country J , given that good y
is the numeraire. For ease of notation, I have expressed indirect utility as a
function of prices only.
3.1.2 Autarchy equilibrium
When country J does not trade, his equilibrium price ratio (denoted by pJA)
is found by equating domestic demand to domestic supply:
1
2
+
KJ
2pJA
= 1
pJA
2
+
KJ
2
= KJ
Solving either of the two above equations yields:
pJA = K
J (4)
11This is equivalent to thinking that there is only one citizen in each country.
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Using equation 3, it is easy to check that any change (both upwards and
downwards) in the price ratio away from pJA increases welfare in country J ,
and this increase is larger the larger the change. This is consistent with
standard theory of the gains from trade. More formally, vJ(p) > vJ(pJA)
8p 6= pJA, and vJ(p0) > vJ(p) > vJ(pJA) 8p, p0 6= pJA such that either p0 < p <
pJA or p
0 > p > pJA. In what follows, I will denote autarchy indirect utility in
country J by vJA, i.e.
vJA  vJ
 
KJ

(5)
3.1.3 Trade equilibrium
Consider the case in which countries can trade. Given that there are three
countries in this model, di¤erent equilibrium prices may obtain depending
on which are the countries involved in the trade. I will use the notation
fH;F; g to denote the case in which countriesH and F trade with each other
and country E remains in autarchy. Analogously, the other two possible
two-country cases will be denoted by fH; ; Eg and f; F; Eg; the notation
fH;F;Eg, instead, will represent di¤erent situations in which all countries
trade with at least one other country, but not necessarily with both. Note
that, due to the absence of transport costs, the equilibrium price ratio will
be the same in all the fH;F;Eg cases.
The assumption of linear production functions ensures that factor price
equalization obtains (Dixit and Norman, 1980). This ensures that we can
nd the equilibrium prices by solving for the integrated trade equilibria, i.e.
by nding the autarchy equilibrium prices a single country with endowments
equal to the sum of the endowments of countries who trade. For example,
equilibrium prices in the fH;F; g case are found by equating demand and
supply in the integrated setting (for example, for good x):
1
2
+
KH
2p
+
1
2
+
KF
2p
= 2
Denote by pJfH;F;g the price ratio faced by citizens in country J when only
H and F trade. Solving for either of the two above equations gives:
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pHfH;F;g = K
 
1 + 
2

pFfH;F;g = K
 
1 + 
2

pEfH;F;g = p
E
A
(6)
Equilibrium prices in all other cases are found similarly:
pHf;F;Eg = p
H
A
pFf;F;Eg = K
 
1 + +
2

pEf;F;Eg = K
 
1 + +
2

pHfH;;Eg = K
 
1 + 
2

pFfH;;Eg = p
F
A
pEfH;;Eg = K
 
1 + 
2
 (7)
pHfH;F;Eg = K
 
1 + +
3

pFfH;F;Eg = K
 
1 + +
3

pEfH;F;Eg = K
 
1 + +
3

Given the prices in 6 and 7, together with the fact that indirect utility is
monotonically increasing in a change in the price ratio, it is easy to pin down
the agentspreferences over di¤erent trade outcomes. Here, I will consider
only the case in which  2 (0; ); the case in which  2 (;1) is in the
Appendix. For H and F , if  2  0; 
2

we have:12
f; F; Eg H fH; ; Eg H fH;F;Eg H fH;F; g
fH; ; Eg F f; F; Eg F fH;F; g F fH;F;Eg
If, instead,  2  
2
; 

:
f; F; Eg H fH; ; Eg H fH;F; g H fH;F;Eg
fH; ; Eg F f; F; Eg F fH;F;Eg F fH;F; g
12Notice that +3 >

2 ,  2
 

2 ; 

. To simplify the exposition, I am not considering
the case in which  = 2 and  =  here.
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Note that when E is relatively labour intensive ( 2  0; 
2

), H prefers
to trade with F alone than with F and E together, while F prefers to trade
with H and E together. When E is relatively capital intensive ( 2  
2
; 

),
the opposite is true.
For country E, there exist a  () such that, if  2 (0;  ()):
fH;F;Eg ; fH; ; Eg E f; F; Eg
if instead  2 ( () ; ):
fH;F; g ; f; F; Eg E fH; ; Eg
If E is labour intensive ( 2 (0;  ())) her citizens prefers to have a
capital intensive trade partner like F . If she is capital intensive, instead
( 2 ( () ; )), they prefers to have a labour intensive partner like H. In
no circumstance, when  2 (0; ), will E prefer to trade with both H and
F at the same time.13 In the Appendix, I show that  () 2  0; 
2

and
@()
@
> 0 for any .
3.2 Political Model
The political model is inspired by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2006).
Colonialism is modelled in a very simple way: while F and E set their own
policy freely, policy inH is set by F .14 In other words, F has de jure political
power in H.
13This is not always true for  >  (see the Appendix).
14Throughout the paper, I will mostly talk about H, F and E as if they were individual
agents. This is equivalent to assuming that each country is governed by a citizen selected
at random within the population.
13
3.2.1 Policy
There are two policy instruments: trade policy, which is set in all countries,
and a transfer from H to F , which is specic to H.
Trade policy is a set of simple 0 or 1 decisions: it species whether a
country is closed or open to each of the other two countries. Trade between
two countries takes place if and only if both countries agree. Trade policy
can be described by the following matrix
T =

TH TF TE

=
264T
H
H T
F
H T
E
H
THF T
F
F T
E
F
THE T
F
E T
E
E
375
where T IJ = 1 if country I is willing to trade with country J , T
I
J =
0 otherwise (of course, T JJ = 18J). Thus, trade between country I and
country J takes place if and only if T IJ = T
J
I = 1. Mapping from T to the
trade equilibrium, and using the equations in 6 and 7, we can express the
equilibrium price ratios as functions of T,  and  only, pJ(Tj; ). The gains
from trade for country J , can then be written as:
J (Tj; ) = vJ pJ(Tj; )  vJA
The transfer from H to F will be denoted by the letter A. For the fact
that H and F have the same indirect utility function, and that this is linear
in income, we can think of A as a transfer of indirect utility from H to F .
Thus, we can add it linearly to all payo¤ functions. The transfer A is meant
to capture, in the simplest possible way, the redistributive issue between
residents in the colonies and residents in the colonizer.
To capture the fact that it is not optimal for F to reduceH into starvation,
I will assume that there is a minimum level of utility that H must be left
with. Denote this by u, and assume for simplicity that:
u < vHA
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3.2.2 Timing
The political state of the model (S) is initially colonialism: country F , the
colonizer, is entitled to set policy for country H, the colony. In other words,
F controls de jure political power in H. Before choosing policy, F decides
whether to stick to colonialism or to concede independence, that is to sur-
render de jure political power. From Hs point of view, the advantages of
independence are two: rst, they acquire de jure political power, and there-
fore control of policy; second, they obtain exogenous benet B > 0. If F
does not grant independence, H can stage a revolution. The capacity to
stage a revolution represents the de facto political power of H. Through
revolution (which is always successful) they acquire de jure political power
and an exogenous benet b, which is randomly distributed over ( 1; B].
The higher is b, the higher is the de facto political power of H. If H stage a
revolution, THF is automatically set at 0 in the next date. In words, F must
refuse to trade with H any longer.15 How harmful these sanctions are for
H is a measure of Fs economic power: the more harmful the sanctions, the
largest is Fs economic power.
I will denote the three possible political states (colonialism, independence
and revolution) by the notation S = C; I; R. The timing of the game is the
following:
1. Nature choses b;
2. F choses whether to stick to colonialism or to grant independence;
3. T and A are simultaneously set: under colonialism F sets T F , TH and
A; under independence, instead, TH and A are set by H;
4. If F has granted independence, nothing happens at this stage. If the
political state is still colonialism,H decide whether to stage a revolution
or not;
5. If F has granted independence, or if H have not staged a revolution,
nothing happens at this stage. Otherwise, all policy is reset (THF is
automatically set at 0);
15It would be an natural extension to model trade policy as a continuous decision - with
import tari¤s ranging from 0 (free trade) to1 (no trade). In that case, punishment could
simply be the loss of a preferential tari¤ (see the case study of Canada before) and the
level of tari¤ itself could be endogenous to the political conditions. I keep this interesting
extension for future work.
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6. Production, trade and consumption take place; all payo¤s are realized.
The assumption that F sets THF = 0 after a revolution is absolutely cru-
cial for the results of the model. While punishment is not ex-post optimal in
this model, it could be easily rationalized by saying that F has to defend a
reputation as a punisher of rebel colonies, in the attempt to preserve disci-
pline in the rest of the empire. In fact, there is evidence that sanctions are
actually imposed in the real world.
3.3 Equilibrium
Let us proceed to nd the equilibrium of the model by solving backwards:
Date 6
After production, trade and consumption take place, all payo¤s are real-
ized. These depend on the policy choices made in dates 3 and 5 and on world
factor endowments. Denote by V J (T; Aj; ) the nal payo¤ of a citizen of
country J :
V H (T; Aj; ) = vHA +H(Tj; )  A+ B + b (8)
V F (T; Aj; ) = vFA +F (Tj; ) + A (9)
V E (T; Aj; ) = vEA +E(Tj; ) (10)
Where  () is an indicator variable that takes value 1 if the political
state is independence (revolution), and 0 otherwise.
Date 5
If F have conceded independence in date 2, or if H have not staged a
revolution in date 4, nothing happens at this stage. Otherwise, policy is
reset under the constraint THF = 0.
The equilibrium concept for the trade equilibrium is that of coalition-
proof Nash equilibrium. The trade equilibrium is a set of trade policies such
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that 1) no single country has an incentive to deviate to a di¤erent policy;
and 2) no coalition of countries has an incentive to coordinate and deviate
to a di¤erent policy. It can be shown16 that:
Proposition 1 After the colony stages a revolution, the type of trade equi-
librium depends on the endowments parameters ( and ) in the following
way:
 If  2 (0;  ()), that is if the rest of the world is very little capital
intensive, the trade equilibrium is f; F; Eg: thus, the colony falls into
autarchy;
 if  2 ( () ; 2), that is if the capital intensity of the rest of the world
is intermediate, the trade equilibrium is fH; ; Eg: thus, the colonizer
falls into autarchy:
 If  2 (2;1), that is the rest of the world is very capital intensive, the
trade equilibrium is of the type fH;F;Eg: thus, all countries trade.
The threshold  () is dened in Section 3.1.3 above as the relative capital
intensity of country E, for which its citizens are indi¤erent between trading
with H only and trading with F only. As for extraction, it is straightforward
that:
Proposition 2 Denote by A (S) extraction under political state S: then,
A (R) = 0.
Proposition 1 and 2 above, and 3 and 4 below, create a complete mapping
between political states and policy. It is then possible to express equilibrium
price ratios, gains from trade and payo¤s as functions of political states and
endowments only. Thus, we will use the notation pJ(S; ; ), J (S; ; ) and
V J (S; ; ) from now on.
Date 4
If F has granted Independence in date 2, nothing happens at this stage. If,
instead, we are still under colonialism, H decide whether to stage a revolution
or not. Using 8, revolution is protable if and only if:
16Proofs of all proposition are in the Appendix.
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H (R; ; ) + b > H (C; ; )  A (C) (11)
The above inequality has, on the left-hand side, the nal payo¤ to H
under revolution, while on the right-hand side it has their nal payo¤ under
colonialism.17 Given that H cannot be left with less than u, the maximum
that can be extracted under colonialism is A = H (C; ; ) + vHA   u; after
plugging this in 11, we will say that there is a revolutionary constraint if and
only if:
b >   vHA   u  H (R; ; )  b (12)
If b, the exogenous benet from revolution, is lower than the threshold b,
revolution never takes place - not even if F , the colonizer, pushes extraction
to its maximum. If, instead, b is higher than b, F is constrained to keep
extraction below its maximum if she wants to stave o¤ a revolution. The
formula for b has a simple intuition. When extraction is maximum, the gain
from violently acquiring de jure political power is high; it is not, however,
always as high as from simply resetting extraction to zero, for there may
be some trade disruption following to revolution. Using the above notation,
while maximum extraction is H (C; ; ) + vHA   u the rebel colony is only
able to appropriate H (R; ; ) + vHA   u, where H (R; ; )  H (C; ; ).
The threshold b is the value for b that exactly o¤sets the gain from violently
acquiring de jure political power when extraction is maximum, therefore
making H perfectly indi¤erent to revolution in this case.
Date 3
In date 3 there are two possibilities: either we are still under colonialism,
in which case F sets policy for H, or we are under independence, and H sets
policy autonomously. It is possible to show that:
Proposition 3 Both under colonialism and under independence, the trade
equilibrium is of the type fH;F;Eg independently on the endowment para-
meters. Thus, all countries trade, and pJ = K
 
1 + +
3
 8J and 8; .
17Autarchy utility drops from the inequality, as it appears on both sides.
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It is important to note that, while under revolution the trade equilibrium
depends on  and  (Proposition 1) under colonialism it does not. Thus, the
disruption in trade following to a revolution will depend on  and  as well.
As for extraction, this is obviously set at minimum (A (I) = 0) under
independence. Under colonialism, there are two possibilities: if there is no
revolutionary constraint (b < b) F can impose maximum extraction (A =
H (C; ; )+ vHA  u). If, instead, there is a revolutionary constraint (b > b)
F seeks to maximise extraction subject to not triggering a revolution. This
is done by choosing A in such a way that 11 holds as an equality:18
A = H (C; ; )  H (R; ; )  b
All this can be summarized in the following:
Proposition 4 Denote by A (S) extraction under political state S. Then,
A (I) = 0: As for A (C), this is maximum (A (C) = H (C; ; ) + vHA   u)
if b < b, less than maximum and equal to H (C; ; )   H (R; ; )   b if
b > b (where b is dened in eq. 12.
Date 1 and 2
In date 1, Nature chooses b: This is a measure of Hs de facto political
power: the higher is b, the higher is de facto political power. The choice of
b determines Fs decision on whether to surrender or not de jure political
power in date 2.
Inspecting equation 9 in light of the results of Proposition 3 immediately
suggests that F nds it optimal to grant independence whenever A (C) is
negative. Using Proposition 4, it is easy to see that this happens if and only
if:
b > H (C; ; )  H (R; ; )  b (13)
If b, the exogenous benet from revolution, is lower than the threshold b,
country F , the colonizer, can stave o¤ a revolution by choosing the appro-
priate level of extraction, and this is always positive. If, instead, b is higher
18I am using the tie-breaking assumption that revolution does not take place when it
yields just the same payo¤ as colonialism.
19
than b, the level of extraction that would be needed to stave o¤ a revolution
is negative. Given that this is not optimal, F decides to concede indepen-
dence when b > b. Again, the formula for b has a simple intuition. When
extraction is zero, the gain from violently acquiring de jure political power
is always non-positive and exactly equal to the trade disruption following
to revolution (captured by H (R; ; )   H (C; ; )). This is because the
same policy is set in H, both under colonialism and under revolution. The
threshold b is the value for b that exactly o¤sets the trade disruption fol-
lowing to revolution, therefore making H perfectly indi¤erent to revolution
when extraction is zero.
  
Proposition 5 summarizes the characteristics of the equilibrium:
Proposition 5 The political state of the model depends on the exogenous
benet from revolution, b, in the following way:
 If b < b there is no departure from colonialism and F , the colonizer,
imposes maximum extraction;
 If b < b < b, there is no departure from colonialism but F imposes only
partial extraction;
 If b < b < B, the model predicts a switch from colonialism to indepen-
dence.
where b and b are dened in equation 12 and 13 respectively.
In what follow, I will make a distinction between colonialism when b < b
(I call this "unconstrained colonialism") and when b < b < b ("constrained
colonialism"). The key point is now to understand how b and b depend on 
and , the endowment parameters.
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3.3.1 Analysis
To make the exposition simpler, I dene
  + 
and study how b and b depend on 

, keeping  constant. The measure


, which takes value in [0; 1], captures the attractiveness of the rest of the
world (as opposed to the colonizer) for the colonys trade. In other words, a
value of 

close to 0 means that the colonys trade is much more attracted
by the colonizer than by the rest of the world, while a value of 

close to 1
means just the opposite. Here, I am xing the total volume of the colonys
trade, and study how the her political state is inuenced by the trade pattern
captured by 

.
Figure 1 gives a qualitative representation of b and b as functions of 

:
δ/γ
1
B
ПH(C,δ,κ)
0
– (νH(pHA) – u)
2/3δ(γ)
Colony H1 Colony H2
Figure 1
The gure plots 

on the horizontal axis and b on the vertical axis.
The threshold  () is dened so that 

<  () if and only if  <  (),
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where  () was dened in Section 3.1.3. The solid, thick line represents b,
whereas the dashed line starting at    vH  pHA   u represents b. According
to Proposition 5, the equilibrium political state is unconstrained colonialism
at points below the dotted line, constrained colonialism at points between
the two lines, and independence at points above the dotted line.
When 

is low (taking value in [0;  ()]), b and b are constant and valued
at   vHA   u and H (C; ; ) respectively. This is the case in which the rest
of the world is so labour intensive that it competes with the colony in selling
labour-intensive goods to the mother country: Proposition 1 tells us that in
this case, trade sanctions have the e¤ect of driving H into autarchy, reducing
their gains from trade to 0 (H (R; ; ) = 0). In other words, sanctions are
fully e¤ective, and F has maximum economic power. As the citizens of H
expect that revolution would destroy H (C; ; ) of their wealth, colonialism
remains unconstrained as long as b is smaller than   vHA   u. As for inde-
pendence, this is obtained when b is positive and greater than H (C; ; ).
When 

takes intermediate values (in the range

 () ; 2
3

), b and b are a
step lower and decreasing monotonically to reach   H (C; ; ) + vHA   u
and 0 respectively. This is the case in which the rest of the world is capital-
intensive enough to compete with the mother country in selling capital-
intensive goods to the colony ( () <  < 2). According to Proposition 1,
sanctions would reduce Hs gains from trade but not drive the colony into
autarchy (0 < H (R; ; ) < H (C; ; )). Thus, compared to the previ-
ous case, sanctions are only partially e¤ective, and F has a lower economic
power (and decreasing in 

). As the revolutionnaires expect that H (R; ; )
of their gains from trade will be recovered after revolution, colonialism is un-
constrained only as long as b is smaller than H (R; ; ) + vHA   u, while
independence comes as soon as b is bigger than H (C; ; )  H (R; ; ).
Finally, when 

2 2
3
; 1

the two thresholds are again constant and valued
at   vHA +H (C; ; )  u and 0, respectively. Here the rest of the world
is so capital intensive, that the colony and the mother country compete with
each other in selling labour-intensive goods to the rest of the world. Propo-
sition 1 tells us that sanctions have no e¤ect in this case: this is because E
are happy to trade with both H and F at the same time. Thus, not only
revolution would not drive H into autarchy, but it would leave their terms of
trade una¤ected (H (R; ; ) = H (C; ; )): sanctions are not ine¤ective,
and F has no economic power. Given that the revolutionnaires can appro-
priate all resources extracted by F under unconstrained colonialism, this can
remain unconstrained only as long as b is smaller than vHA +
H (C; ; ) u,
and has to be abandoned as soon as b is positive.
Proposition 6 summarizes the central result of the paper:
22
Proposition 6 Ceteris paribus, the likelihood of decolonization is constant
or increasing in 

, that is in the attractiveness of the rest of the world (as
opposed to the colonizer) for the colonys trade. At the same time, the likeli-
hood of colonialism with maximum extraction (as opposed to colonialism with
partial extraction, and decolonization) is constant or decreasing in 

. Fur-
thermore, the expected share of colonial wealth that the colony can retain for
herself under colonialism is constant or increasing in 

.
Proposition 6 can be easily illustrated by comparing the case of colonies
H1 and H2 in Figure 1. The two colonies have the same volume of trade
and are equal in all other respects except that H1s trade is much more
attracted by the colonizer than H2s. It is easy to see that the likelihood of
decolonization (the probability that b > b) is lower for H1 than for H2, and
that the likelihood of unconstrained colonialism (the probability that b < b)
is higher for H1 than for H2. As for the expected share of wealth that cannot
be extracted, this is higher for H2 than for H1 at all values of b.19
Note that, if F could not commit to punish rebel colonies by trade sanc-
tions, b and b would be constant in 

(and equal to   vHA +H (C; ; )  u
and 0, respectively). This highlights the central importance of that assump-
tion for the results of the paper.
4 Historical Evidence
The key result of my model is that, ceteris paribus, the amount of wealth
that a colonizer is able to extract from her colony is decreasing in the attrac-
tiveness of the rest of the world (as opposed to the colonizer) for the colonys
trade, and so is the sustainability of colonial power. In this section, I look at
a few historical cases which illustrate this point.
One could view decolonizations happening in three main waves.20 First,
the Latin American colonies of Spain and Portugal unilaterally declared their
independence in 1810-1830. Then, in the second half of the same century,
a few important British settler colonies21 peacefully obtained the right to
govern themselves within the British Empire. Finally, most remaining Middle
19We cannot make any prediction for the ceteris paribus e¤ect of  on the likelihood of
constrained colonialism, as that depends on the distribution of b.
20Not considering the more isolated cases of the United States (1776) and Haiti (1804).
21Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa; slightly later came South Rhodesia
and Malta.
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Eastern, Asian and African colonies obtained their independence in a 40-year
period beginning around 1930. I concentrate on the rst two waves, and in
particular on the case the Spanish Empire (Section 5.1) and of Canada and
Australia (Section 5.2).
In the case of the Spanish Empire, I rst show how the tribute the
colonies paid decreased as European manufacturing capital relocated outside
the Spanish Empire during 1600-1750, and rose again with Spains modest
economic development in the second half of 18th century. I then argue that
the deposition of the Spanish king by Napoleon (1808) was particularly likely
to result in the independence of Latin America, because of the concentration
of manufacturing capital in Britain due to the industrial revolution. In the
cases of Canada and Australia, I show how Britain conceded self-government
only after their raw materials began to be exported extensively to regions
outside of the British Empire - the US for Canadian timber, continental
Europe for Australian wool.
4.1 The Spanish Empire: decadence, revival and fall,
1590-1810
The Spanish colonies of Latin America became independent after a series
of successful rebellions in 1810-1827. Many argue that the French invasion
of Spain in 1808 triggered them. I argue that the invasion was particularly
likely to result in revolution because of the change in economic incentives
that the industrial revolution in Britain had brought. The economy of Span-
ish America relied on the exchange of silver and agricultural commodities for
European manufactured goods. By 1810, the accumulation of manufactur-
ing capital in Britain was making her the natural trading partner of Latin
America: in terms of the model,  was growing much higher than . Thus,
the invasion of Spain decreased the cost of rebellion (b) when the cost of
rebellion in terms of trade disruption was already very low (b close to zero).
Furthermore, the tribute that Spain asked from the colonies (A) was very
high, reecting perhaps the trade conditions of the period 1750-1790 more
than the current ones. I extend this logic to analyse the fortunes of Spanish
imperialism since its golden age in 16th century, and argue that the pat-
tern of extraction adapted over the centuries to reect the concentration of
manufacturing capital within or without the Spanish Empire.
Background and Political Developments
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Conquistadores in the rst half of 16th century established the Spanish
Empire, and it rapidly extended to cover almost half of the American con-
tinent. After plundering the riches of the natives, the Spaniards set out to
organise the extraction of the mineral and agricultural wealth of the colonies.
The social structure that they created had at its bottom a mass of people
(mainly native Indians, but also imported Negroes) that was forced to work
at very little or no salary in the plantations and mines. Above them were
the creoles, the descendents of Spanish immigrants. These were the legal
owners of the assets of the colonies, and the people to whom the working
class owed their labour obligations. On top were the peninsular Spaniards
with whom the Crown shared the benets of political power. For centuries,
the imperial economy was centred on two large silver mining centres (Upper
Peru and Mexico) that the other colonies supplied with foodstu¤s and basic
manufactures. In the early 18th century, after the Upper Peruvian silver
economy declined sharply, various South American regions that had served
as suppliers for it began to export their production (e.g. Venezuela, Chile).
All colonial needs besides food and basic manufactures were satised with
imports from Europe.
From the late 16th century to 1776, the ports of Seville, rst, and later
Cadiz, monopolized o¢ cial trade between Europe and Spanish America.22
This fact may seem to contradict the result in Proposition 3 - that colonizers
should allow their colonies to integrate with the rest of the world - but it
does not. Colonizers were the ercest promoters of colonial exports, and
when they assumed for themselves the role of entrepot they did so with a
view to promote, rather than hinder, such trade. With all the distortions
that it entailed, the Cadiz monopoly did not prevent Latin American silver
from being exchanged outside Spain for non-Spanish manufactures. In the
model, all distortions to production and consumption are assumed away for
simplicity, and the redistributive e¤ect of the trade monopoly is captured
by the lump sum transfer A. In fact, the trade monopoly was not the only
tool through which the Spanish redistributed the wealth of the colonies to
themselves. While the Indians and Negroes were forced to work for the
creoles, a series of taxes and regulations (for example, the reservation of top
colonial jobs for peninsular Spaniards) made sure that a portion of colonial
wealth ended up in Spanish pockets.
Yet extracting resources from the creoles proved increasingly di¢ cult
over time: in other words, A seems to have declined steadily in 1600-1750.
TePaske and Klein (1981) show that the share of Mexican public revenues
22Trade was done by two large, military-excorted eets, which sailed yearly (or less fre-
quently) from Cadiz to Veracruz (Mexico) and Cartegena/Portobello (Colombia/Panama).
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remitted to Spain or to other parts of the empire23 decreased from 57 per
cent in the 1610s to 23 per cent in the 1690s. Similarly, only 10 per cent
of Peruvian public revenues was remitted in the 1660s as opposed to 64 per
cent in the 1590s (TePaske, 1983). Contrary to a traditional view of Spanish
colonialism, remittances did not decline because of a fall in silver produc-
tion - colonial public revenues were roughly constant over these periods - but
rather because of an increasing incapacity of Spain to extract wealth from
her colonies (TePaske and Klein, 1981). As argued by Lynch (1965-1969, p.
195), over time the creoles "...appropriated more of their own production,
and employed their capital in their own administration, defence and invest-
ment". A similar pattern is observable in the appointment of top colonial
o¢ cials: for example, while in 1600-1678 none of the judges in the colonial
Audiencias (the highest colonial courts) was of Creole origin, in 1678-1750
the creoles had 44 per cent of the seats (Lynch, 1992, p. 77). As for the
redistributive e¤ect of the Cadiz monopoly, this was modied by a series of
laws that increased the bargaining power of colonial versus peninsular mer-
chants.24 Thus, Spanish colonialism was relatively constrained in early 18th
century, and the colonists were capable of retaining their wealth for them-
selves. As argued by Lynch (1973), this was one fundamental reasons why
the colonists did not take advantage of the War of Spanish Succession (1702)
to revolt.
After 1750, however, the situation changed. The Bourbon dynasty, which
had ruled Spain since 1702, set out to re-establish Spanish imperial authority
in what has been described as the "second conquest of America" (Lynch,
1973, p. 7). The pattern of concessions made over the preceding 150 years
was suddenly reversed. Taxation was increased, tax administration made
more e¢ cient, and a higher share or revenues began to be remitted to Spain
(Lynch, 1973, p. 11). New and old administrative institutions were put
under the inuence of peninsular Spaniards - in the Audiencias, the share of
creoles in 1751-1808 dropped to 23 per cent. Instruments of Creole power
(such as the order of the Jesuits) were dismantled, and the rising power of
colonial chambers of commerce put under control.25 In terms of the model,
23Some share of the richest treasuries (those of Mexico and Lima) was transferred to
the poorer regions of the empire. In XVII, the Philippines were the largest recipient of
such transfers (TePaske and Klein, 1981).
24For example, in 1714 the Spanish merchants were forbidden direct access to the inland
markets of the Americas; in 1749 the American merchants were granted the right to ship
money to Spain and purchase directly goods in Cadiz (Walker, 1979 p. 213 and 218).
By 1750 the colonial merchants were "... within a stones throw of victory and virtual
economic self-determination" (Walker, 1979, p. 15).
25After 1750, the confrontation between Spanish and colonial merchants, which had
seen the latter having the upper hand for more than 50 years, reached a sort of impasse
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A increased steadily after 1750.
By the early 19th century, this new imperialism had created an alarming
level of frustration in the colonies (Lynch, 1973). The atmosphere in Latin
America in 1810 when Napoleon deposed the king was markedly di¤erent
than in 1702. In both situations, the political turmoil decreased the expected
cost of a rebellion; in the language of the model, b increased. Only in 1810,
however, did this increase result in rebellion. Creole rebellion came in two
waves, one "... advancing from the Rio de la Plata [Argentina], across the
Andes to the Pacic", the other veering from Venezuela to New Granada
[Colombia] and back to its birthplace" (Lynch, 1973, p. 35). In less than 20
years, and despite the fact that the Spanish monarchy was restored in 1815,
all colonies became independent from Spain.26
Analysis
We have seen how the level of extraction that Spain imposed on her
American empire (A in the model) was very high in 16th century, declined
steadily in 17th and the rst half of 18th century, and partially recovered
in the second half of 18th century. But was this pattern matched by the
evolution of world factor endowments that the model suggests? Given the
structure of Latin American trade, we would expect that the capacity of
Spain to extract wealth from her American colonies would be high or low
depending on whether the manufacturing capital that is complementary to
the colonies trade is mainly concentrated within or without the Spanish
empire (in the model, an increase in  relative to ).
In fact, while the Spanish empire in the time of Charles V and Phillip II
(1519-1598) included some of the most important manufacturing regions in
Europe (such as the Duchy of Milan and Flanders) the era of the Hapsburg
kings after Philip (1598-1702) witnessed an inexorable decline in the man-
ufacturing capacity of the Empire relative to other European powers(see
Hamilton, 1937, pp. 170-171). For example in the textile sector - which rep-
resented the bulk of Latin American imports - Milan and Flanders lost their
leadership to England, Holland and, slightly later, France (Wilson, 1960, p.
219). As many authors argue (Kamen, 1978; Flynn, 1982; and Acemoglu,
(Walker, 1979, p. 14).
26This result is in contrast with the result of the model that revolution never takes place.
This is, of course, because of the assumption that the colonizers can always instantaneously
adapt the level of extraction to the current attractiveness of revolution. To remove this
assumption and generate equilibrium revolution, it would be su¢ cient to modify the model
to the case in which the policy is set before b is realized, and cannot be adapted afterwards.
This extension would not change any of the results of the model, and I therefore stick to
the version presented in Section 3.
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Johnson and Robinson, 2005), this decline was due to the predatory behav-
iour of the Spanish oligarchy, which squandered the American treasure in
luxurious consumption and costly wars across Europe (see also Flynn, 1982,
p. 143-145). As a result, the import needs of the Latin Americans were
increasingly served by producers outside of the Spanish Empire: by the end
of 17th century, just about 5% of the goods leaving Cadiz were of Spanish
origins (Walker, 1979, p. 13) and the Andalusian merchants "... had been
turned into nothing more than the agents of foreign manufacturers and busi-
nessmen" (Walker, 1979, p. 11). At the same time, smuggling from the
Dutch, English and French trading posts in the Caribbean and Africa grew
faster than ever before.27
After the Bourbon dynasty took over in Spain (1702), however, this pat-
tern slowly changed. The new dynasty started an ambitious programme of
economic reforms that included promoting the inow of skilled textile artisans
from France and England (La Force, 1964) and opening new royal factories
endowed with cutting-edge manufacturing technology. Initially, the reforms
were not very successful because vested interests resisted them ercely. But
by the second half of the century, Spanish industry appeared to be seriously
catching up with the rest of Europes. Fisher (1998, p. 460) argues that the
1780s and early 1790s were periods of unparalleled prosperity and economic
growth for Spain. For example in the textile sector, Barcelona became a
leading centre of calico production in Europe (La Force, 1964).
The e¤ect of the Bourbon reforms on trade with Latin America is evident:
already in 1748-1765, the share of Spanish imports in total Latin American
imports had grown to 15 per cent (Garcia-Baquero Gonzales, 1976). By
1778, this share was 38 per cent. In the same year, the Crown introduced
discriminatory tari¤s on non Spanish imports to favour the industrial devel-
opment of Spain, and as a result, the Spanish share rose to 52 per cent in
1782-1796 (Fisher, 1981, p. 27). This increase was not because of a fall in
exports to Latin America due to protectionism, as total exports amounted
to 3.8 million pesos in 1778 and 14.1 million in 1795 (Ibid).
But if Spain was really an important trading partner for Spanish America,
why were the creoles so quick to declare their independence when Napoleon
arrived? One possible interpretation is that by the turn of the century the
industrial development of Spain was completely overshadowed by Britains.
27Of course, an alternative explanation for the weakening of Spanish authority could be
that the military power of Spain decline vis-à-vis her colonies. This explanation cannot be
ruled out, but as long as military power is proportional to national product, it seems at
odd with the fact that overall, both the Spanish and Latin American economies seem to
have stagnated in 17th century, rather than diverged (for Spain, see Acemoglu, Johnson
and Robinson, 2005; for Latin America, see TePaske and Klein, 1981)
28
In fact, while in Spain the period of highest growth was over in the 1790s,
growth in Britain would continue undisturbed for several decades, making
it the most capital-intensive country in the world for most of 19th century.
By the beginning of the century, Britain was already producing excess man-
ufactured goods, and her merchants, faced with the loss of markets brought
about by the American revolution and prolonged wars in Europe, began
looking at Latin America as a market potentially as rich as those of India
or the United States (Kaufmann, 1951, p. 6-7). There is plenty of anec-
dotal evidence that, on the American side, the creoles who rebelled against
Spain cared about maintaining their trade with Britain as much as their po-
litical independence (see both Kaufmann, 1951, and Lynch, 1973). There
is also anecdotal evidence that British diplomatic activities favoured Latin
American independence (Kaufmann, 1951). Thus, one possible interpreta-
tion of the Latin American revolutions is that the French invasion of Spain
did nothing but bring the inevitable for a political situation that was per se
unsustainable: while the industrial growth of Britain was making the trade
disruption stemming from a revolution against Spain increasingly irrelevant
(in the model, while  was increasing rapidly), Spanish policy was not ad-
justing to take this into account (A remained very high).
4.2 British settler colonies and self-government
Unlike the Spanish Empire, where colonial administration formally remained
in the hands of the Crown until independence, various forms of power shar-
ing existed within the British Empire. Before 1849, there were two types of
British colonies.28 In the crown colonies, the British retained all legislative,
executive and judiciary power;29 in all other colonies, some type of repre-
sentative institution was in place.30 The extent to which these institutions
represented colonial societies depended on the share of seats reserved for
locals, and on whether locals were selected by the governor or elected by
the population (voting was normally only a privilege of those with wealth).
These institutions did not substantially undermine control of de jure politi-
28Protectorates are not included in this categorisation.
29British o¢ cials in charge of government decisions were periodically turned over, and
major decisions were taken in London.
30Typically, these institutions consisted of an executive council, a legislative council and
an assembly (but the assembly was often missing). The executive council was a sort of
government who assisted the governor with the administration of the colony, while the
legislative council and the assembly had some legislative and advisory power.
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cal power by the British, as the governor retained the power to appoint and
dismiss top o¢ cials, and to veto all local legislation.
With the concession of self-government to Canada in 1849, a substantially
new type of representative institution emerged. The key innovation was
that top o¢ cials were appointed and dismissed only on the indication of
the popularly elected part of the legislation (be it the legislative council or
the assembly)31. This was a major surrendering of de jure political power,
one that substantially anticipated formal independence. Between 1849 and
1923, ve more British colonies were granted this privilege: Australia, New
Zealand, South Africa, South Rhodesia and Malta. Most of them obtained
formal independence with the treaty of Westminster in 1931.
There seems to be a positive correlation between the degree of admin-
istrative autonomy that a colony could hope to achieve within the British
Empire and the share of settlers of British or European origins in her pop-
ulation. Most colonies with no European settlers were crown colonies, while
the others were normally given representative institutions at an early stage
of their political history. Furthermore, all "pure" settler colonies32 (with the
exception of the US) obtained self-government at a later stage. To reconcile
this fact with the model would require assuming that settlers have a higher
capacity to revolt than natives, something that could be justied in a num-
ber of ways.33 Empirically, this poses important limitations. It seems in
particular that any cross-section analysis that relies on the assumption that
the exogenous cost of revolution (b) is distributed equally across colonies
should be rened to control for settlers.34 In what follows, I limit myself to
studying whether the time series of two "pure" settler colonies who obtained
self-government can be explained with a change in economic incentives as
suggested by my model.
31The Crown remained responsible for administering foreign and trade policy, and re-
tained formal veto power on local legislation. The latter, however, was rarely used during
the life of this institutional arrangement.
32By this it is meant all colonies where the economic importance of the indigenous
population was negligible: basically, the various colonies of Canada and Australia (see
Mosley, 1983).
33For example, settlers could be less willing to be ruled despotically because of the
institutions they brought with them from Europe (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson,
2001b). Also, it could be argued that smaller groups of settlers were in greater need of
assistance by the colonizer to keep control of the natives. On the belief that it deserves a
fuller theoretical treatment, I keep this issue for future research.
34This is because of the colonies who received self-government, Canada, Australia and
New Zealand are unique for their level of settlers and received self-government at very
close points in time; South Africa came somewhat later, but it also represent a special
case in terms of settlers. Very interesting, instead, will be to study why North Rhodesia
received self-government while South Rhodesia didnt. I keep this issue for future research.
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4.2.1 Canada
The British colonies of Canada obtained self-government at the end the 1840s,
a decade during which the British attitude towards Canadian independence
suddenly became more conciliatory (Conrad, Finkel and Jaenen, 1993, p.
427). Just one decade before, policy disagreements between Britain and
Canada over the issue led to riots, repression and the defence of the status
quo. In the rst half of the 19th century, the Canadian economy relied on
exports of timber and trans-shipped US wheat for her prosperity. I argue that
one key reason why Britain adopted a new attitude towards Canadian self-
government was that the structure of Canadian trade fundamentally changed
around 1840. On one hand, rapid urbanization and growth in the US created
strong North American demand for timber. On the other, the dismantling of
the tari¤ system that had granted colonies preferential access to the British
market had left Canadian timber uncompetitive in Europe. Because of both
factors, the timber-processing capital that was relevant to Canadian trade
relocated from Britain to North America: in terms of the model,  increased
relative to . Soon, it appeared clear that the cost of concessions needed to
keep political power in Canada was too large, and responsible government
was granted (in terms of the model, A became negative).
Background and political developments
Both Quebec and Ontario35 were annexed to the British Empire in 1763.
While Quebec was a French "pure" settlers colony (about 60 thousands in-
habitants in 1763), Ontario was part of a scarcely populated region of the
American Midwest that had long been disputed between the British and the
French. There, large European settlement began only after 1783, with the
inow of British Loyalists from the US. In both provinces population grew
fast in the following 50 years, reaching 550 thousands in Quebec and 231
thousands in Ontario by 1831.36 Most immigrants were English speaking in
this period, resulting in the French share of Quebec population decreasing to
about a third by 1850.
Before 1800, the economy was split between subsistence agriculture and
the fur import-export industry.37 This dualistic economic structure con-
35Before 1870, British Canada was made up of several independent colonies. I will focus
on Quebec and Ontario for their high relative population density and economic importance.
36In both provinces, the size of the indigenous population was insignicant.
37The fur trade was the backbone of the Canadian economy since XVII century. Fur
was purchased in a vast area surrounding the Great Lakes and the American Midwest,
and shipped to Europe through the St. Lawrence river.
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tributed to create a very polarized society, where the interests of settlers-
farmers and of merchants often diverged. This will have important conse-
quences for Canadian politics, as we shall see. In the rst two decades of
1800s, the fur trade disappeared and the two industries that would dominate
the economy for the next 50 years emerged: the import-export of US food-
stu¤, and the production and export of timber. The rst was the natural
successor of the fur trade, and was mainly a mercantile enterprise. But where
did the timber trade originate from, and whom did it benet?
Ever since the 16th century, Britain had based her military and economic
power on the strength of her commercial and military navy. This factor,
together with urbanization levels with no equivalent in Europe, contributed
to making Britain the largest timber consumer in the world at the end of
18th century. Due to scarce domestic supply, most timber was imported
from the Baltics; during the Napoleonic wars, however, a series of major
supply break-ups showed how vulnerable that source of supply could be,
and how this could threaten the military supremacy of Britain in Europe.38
Canadian timber was abundant and of high quality, but the timber industry
had failed to develop for the high cost of shipping this bulky commodity
to Europe. In 1802, however, the British introduced a discriminatory tari¤
against non-imperial timber, which more than compensated for Canadas
disadvantage. As a result, by 1820 more than 80 per cent of British imports
were of Canadian origins (Marr and Paterson, 1980).
For the Canadians, this was a primary source of prosperity: a large share
of the population was involved in timber production and trading39, and be-
tween 1829 and 1845 timber made up for over 40 per cent of Canadian exports
(with year peaks of 70 per cent, despite the importance of the import-export
industry; Marr and Paterson, 1980, p. 61).
Turning to political developments, the rst important event in Canadian
political history is the concession by Britain of representative institutions in
1790. In each colony, these consisted of an appointed executive and legislative
council and an elective assembly. Just as in other settler colonies of the
British Empire, these institutions did not represent a signicant surrendering
of de jure political power by the British. In fact, the governor retained the
power to chose the members of the two councils, and had many legislative
tools at his disposal to weaken the power of the assembly.
38Not only did Britains military power rely more on timber: her European rivals enjoyed
a large domestic supply, and a safer access to North-Eastern European exports.
39The timber trade was of importance to farmers (who harvested it on the margin of their
land, and supplied foodstu¤ to lumbering camps) lumberjacks, sawmill entrepreneurs and
workers, and a large number of middlemen (Marr and Paterson, 1980, p. 64-65; Pomfret,
1981, p. 25; Easterbrook and Aitken, 1956, p. 159).
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Initially, all appointed and elective seats were occupied by merchants, and
the relations with Britain were good. After 1820, however, farmers, made
more numerous by immigration, secured control of the two elective assem-
blies, and a sharp conict over the destination of public revenues began. This
grew particularly bitter in Quebec, were farmers (mainly of French origins)
were an old and compact social group. There were several key issues at stake:
rst, farmers advocated the free import of US manufactures, whereas Britain
defended the import tari¤40 cherished by her manufacture producers and by
both British and Canadian merchants. The same logic of commerce induced
British o¢ cials to favour public investment in the improvement of the St.
Lawrence canal system, while farmers pressed for investing in agricultural
infrastructure. Finally, farmers wanted Crown land to be sold directly to
them and at cheap prices, while the British government use to sell it to large
British land speculators rst. On all of these issues, the Canadian merchants
were the natural ally of the British, and they were systematically chosen to
ll in the seats of the executive and legislative council in the 1820s and 1830s.
In the 1830s, frictions increased together with the timber trade and public
revenues. By the middle of the decade, a few radical leaders of the farmers
were asking for the executive and legislative councils to be nominated by the
assemblies, and responsible to them only. It was, in essence, the request for
self-government. Faced with no consideration by the British, these leaders
came to see independence from Britain as a necessary step to access power
(Conrad, Finkel and Jaenen, 1993, pp. 412-424). Then, in 1837, the governor
denied the long-established right of the Quebec assembly to authorise new
revenues, and an additional slot of 2.1 million hectares of Crown land was
sold to British speculators. At the news, violent riots erupted in Montreal,
followed by similar protests in Ontario. But despite the fact that their mo-
tivations were shared by many, these riots did not succeed in appealing to
the general population. Thus, the numbers involved were small (see Conrad,
Finkel and Jaenen, 1993, p. 418-419), and the British could easily repress
them. Soon after, the pre-riots status quo was re-established (Conrad, Finkel
and Jaenen, 1993, p. 425; Creigthon, 1966, p. 250), and Canadian opposition
returned quite for the next several years.
In the 1840s, things began moving again, but in a substantially di¤er-
ent way. On one hand, the moderate reformers of the two colonies who
had not taken part in the riots joined forces in 1842 and formed a new,
compact political movement which, from that moment onwards, would con-
40Ever since the Huskisson Acts of 1825, colonies could import goods from all recip-
rocating foreign countries at an Empire-wide tari¤. This went a long way towards the
abolition of the Navigation Laws, which for centuries had forced the British colonies to
trade with the rest of the world through Britain.
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duct a much more compact opposition to the authoritarian temptations of
the governor. On the other hand, this opposition was corresponded by in-
creasing concessions made by the three governors which succeeded to Lord
Durham (1840-1846), and a large imperial loan was granted to the colonies.
By the second half of the decade, the opinion that control of government in
Canada was not worth making more concessions began to circulate within
British o¢ cial circles (Creighton, 1966, p. 258). This pregured the turning
point, the moment in which the British government rst accepted Canadian
self-government. This was on the belief that . . . it is neither possible nor
desirable to carry on the government of any of the British provinces in North
America in opposition to the opinion of the inhabitants(the Colonial Sec-
retary, Earl Grey, as reported by Creighton, 1966, p. 259-260). Both Quebec
and Ontario obtained self-government in 1849.
Analysis
Can this change in political climate be explained with a change in the eco-
nomic incentives to rebellion along the lines suggested in Section 3? Propo-
sition 6 claims that the likelihood of decolonization is non-decreasing in the
attractiveness of the rest of the world (as opposed to the colonizer) for the
colonys trade. This is because as the factor endowments to which colonial
trade is attracted become more concentrated outside of the empire, the capac-
ity of the colonizer to impose harmful trade sanctions decreases, increasing
the capacity of the colony to stage a revolution.
In fact, there seems to have been a key discontinuity in the structure of
Canadian international trade between the 1830s and the 1840s. In the 1830s,
the distribution of the worlds endowments of timber and capital (the capital
of the timber-based industries) was such that, despite the large Canadian
supply, the British Empire was a net importer of timber from the rest of
the world. In the 1840s, things changed in two important ways. First, the
US became a major net importer of timber. Second, in a major and nal
step towards her conversion to free trade, Britain dismantled the preferential
tari¤ system that had long protected domestic and colonial producers of
agricultural commodities and raw materials.41
The US rstly turned into a net importer of timber at the end of the 1830s,
as the onset of a long economic boom lead was accompanied by rapid urban-
ization in the East coast.42 Already in the early 1840s, substantial amounts
41Britain began dismantling the old system of trade restrictions in the early 1820s: by
the second half of XIX what was then the greatest economic power of the world had fully
converted to free trade, and several other countries had followed suit.
42Up until the mid 1830s, domestic supply of Maine (the large reserves of the West
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of Canadian timber took their way South notwithstanding a still-high US
import tari¤ on natural products. By 1849, export to the US represented
24 per cent of Canadian timber exports, and this valued increased to 34 per
cent in the second half of the 1850s and 50 per cent in the second half of the
1860s (Lower, Carrothers and Saunders, 1938, p. 101 and 134).43
Britain began dismantling the old system of trade restrictions in the early
1820s, and, by the second half of 19th century, she had fully converted to free
trade. In the 1840s, a series of major reforms abolished the import tari¤s
on several agricultural commodities and raw materials. For decades, these
tari¤s had granted high prot for British producers to the detriment of con-
sumers and employers of the manufacturing sectors. Often, their protection
extended to colonial producers, who were granted at least a preferential tar-
i¤ on their exports. Their abolition was a severe blow to both. In the case
of Canada, the strategic considerations that had warranted the introduction
of the preferential tari¤ in 1802 had become increasingly outdated, and the
tari¤ was dismantled without exception.
For the Canadians, the tari¤ was crucial to o¤set their disadvantage in
terms of higher transport costs. Its abolition exposed them to the ercest
European competition, and, as a consequence, the share of Canadian timber
in the British market fell dramatically over the following decades (Marr and
Paterson, 1980, p. 70). From the Canadianspoint of view, this decreased
the importance of Britain as a trading partner, and had therefore the same
e¤ect as a sudden relocation of relevant factor endowments outside the British
Empire.
Thus, the model suggests that the new political climate which pervaded
British-Canadian relations in the 1840s and culminated in the concession
of self-government in 1849 could be attribute to the fact that the factor to
which Canadian trade was attracted were becoming to relocate outside of
the British Empire namely to the US. This undermined the capacity of
Britain to impose e¤ective trade sanctions against Canada, therefore making
revolution relative more attractive. Faced with an increased local pressure,
the British tried to stick to the old colonial system, only to realize that this
would cost them more, in terms of concessions, that they were willing to pay.
Self-government was thus conceded as a way for Britain to get free of the
burden the Canadian colonies had come to represent.
and Midwest were still unexplored at that time) had been more than enough to cover
domestic demand, to the point that timber used to be exported to Canada and from there
to Britain.
43In fact, timber was the leading industry in determining the re-orientation of the Cana-
dian economy away from Britain and towards the US in the second half of XIX century
(Easterbrook and Aitken, 1956, p. 204).
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One possible alternative explanation for the change in British attitude
towards Canadian independence is that rapid immigration and settlement
increased the de facto political power of the Canadian masses, up to a point
in the 1840s when de jure political power had to be surrendered. In fact,
one major consequence of the timber trade was that immigration boomed
in 1820-1860, for the high loading capacity of ships on their way back to
America o¤ered a cheap passage to many European emigrants. It is per-
fectly plausible that immigration may have played a role. Note however that
there is no necessary correspondence between population growth and polit-
ical independence, as shown by the fact that the United States remained a
trustful colony during many decades of rapid population growth in the rst
half of 18th century. Also, population growth in Canada was matched by
high population growth in Britain in the rst half of 19th century, so it is
not clear which way the balance of power should have been altered. Finally,
historians tend to acknowledge that there was a link between the evolution
of Canadas external trade and the coming of responsible government in the
1840s, even though they have not formalized their intuition. For example,
Creighton (1937, p. 364) argues that:
To contemporaries, who could best appreciate the interlocking mechanism
of the old system, the action of Great Britain implied the most inevitable
break-up of the empire; and they felt the old ties loosen around them with
both regret and a kind of bitter impatience to be free" (Creighton, 1937, p.
364).
For all these reasons, I believe that the model presented in Section 3 ts
rather well the case of Canada. I will now turn to the case of another British
settler colony, who received responsible government a few years later.
4.2.2 Australia
The colonies of Australia obtained self-government in 1855-1856. Relative
to Canada, the political process that led to this result was more gradual
and less traumatic; still, it was pushed by an equally stark contrast over
the allocation of colonial public money. I argue that one economic factor
that induced the British to make increasing concessions on these issues, and
eventually concede self government, was the increased competitiveness of the
wool textile industry of continental Europe in the 1840s and 1850s. At that
time, wool was a fundamental source of prosperity for the Australian colonies.
As the industrial revolution began spreading from Britain to the continent
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(mainly France) in the 1840s, continental Europe consumed an increasing
share of the worlds wool in its textile sector. In terms of the model, 
increased relative to .
Background and political developments
The most ancient of the British Australian colonies, New SouthWales was
rstly settled in 1787; originally a part of it, Victoria became an indepen-
dent colony in 1851.44 Initially, the two colonies were meant to accommodate
British convicts; already at the end of 18th century, however, free settlers be-
gan owing numerously, and by 1810 they had become a majority of colonial
society.
The economic history of Australia of the two colonies is easily sum-
marised. Initially, the colonies did not produce any signicant export com-
modity; thus, while they were self-su¢ cient in food, they could only a¤ord to
import manufactures thanks to the nancial help of the mother country. In
the 1810s, however, the colonists discovered that Merino sheep could adapt
very well to the Australian climate, and a small trade of wool developed. For
a fortunate coincidence, this happened when the British demand for wool
was about to explode.
For centuries, the wool textile industry in Britain had relied on home-
grown wool, supplemented by a little import of special-quality Merino wool
from Spain. Given the abundance of wool supply in Europe, this pattern had
required an active protectionist policy by the British government, and until
early 19th century a high import tari¤ on raw wool was in place. With the
development of the wool textile industry, however, the pressure to liberalize
the wool trade intensied, and by the end of the 1810s the protectionist
system was being dismantled. Given that no region in the empire seemed
capable to supply enough wool at that time, a preferential system such as the
one designed for Canada was not on an option; in 1824, therefore, imports
from all sources were liberalized.45 Over the following year, the combination
of free trade and industrialization triggered a boom in wool imports.
Where was this wool imported from? Soon after the elimination of the
tari¤, Germany replaced Spain as the main source of supply, and remained
so throughout the 1830s. Ever since the mid 1820s, however, a signicant
share of supply came from Australia, and in the 1830s the colony became the
44As for Canada, I will focus on the two most ancient and economically signicant
colonies.
45This was to become the rst major step made by Britain towards free trade in XIX
century.
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second largest source of British imports.46 Then in the 1840s, the German
supremacy was displaced: by 1850, the share of Australia was 52 per cent,
that of Germany 12 per cent; in 1870 these gures were 66 per cent and 2 per
cent.47 As a consequence, the 1830s and 1840s were years of great prosperity
for the Australian colonies.
The early political history of Australia is also easy to tell. Between 1787
and 1823, successive British governors ruled in a fully autocratic manner.
Then, in 1823, a type of representative institutions similar to those of many
other British settler colonies was introduced. The extent to which these
institutions represented colonial society was initially very limited, as their
members were all appointed and mostly chosen among British o¢ cials. In
1829, however, the number of seats reserved for locals was increased, and the
prerogatives of the legislative council substantially widened. Still, far from
conguring a substantial loss of de jure political power by the British, the
institutions of 1823/1828 were essentially "...intended to legitimize, rather
than restrict, the governors actions" (Mc Minn, 1979, p. 21). Among the
prerogatives retained by the governor, one, control of land revenues, would
become the main reason for discontent over the following years.
Throughout the 1820s - a time in which the colony did not produce any
signicant wealth that the British could plan on extracting - most of the
quarrelling in Australian politics was among local factions. Particularly hot
was the debate on how to share the scal burden between the rst colo-
nial elite (the so-called exclusivists) and the poorest part of the population
(the emancipists, mainly former convicts). In the second half of the decade,
the leaders of the emancipists came to ask for taxation by representation
and representation by election as a way to decrease the inuence of the
exclusivists on the legislative council.
In the 1830s, however, the nature of the conict changed. As the wool
trade boomed and land revenues became the main source of government
income, exclusivists and emancipists joined in protesting that Britain should
surrender control of land revenues to the legislative council, and that the
latter should be more representative of colonial society. From that moment
and until the concession of self-government, Australian politics was more
about this protesting against Britain than anything else. But what was
exactly the object of discord? Basically, the colonists wanted land revenues
- the provents of the sale of Crown land and grazing licences - to be not
too high in the rst place, and to be devolved on specic public goods like
46There, the Merino sheep population grew exponentially after the 1810s: from 0.3 M
units in 1821, to 2.8 M in 1838 and 13.2 M in 1849 (Shann, 1930).
47signicant suppliers were South Africa (12 per cent in 1870) and South America (5
per cent).
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immigration.48 On the contrary, British governors and their superiors at
the Colonial o¢ ce considered land revenues as "...being held in trust by the
Crown for the Empire as a whole" (Mc Minn, 1979). In practice, throughout
the 1830s their control was used to impose unwanted expenses upon the
colonists. In 1834-1842, for example, the British Treasury transferred the
full cost of jails (still hosting thousands of British convicts) on the colonial
budget.
As time went by, however, protests became more vehement, and in 1842
the British conceded that 50 per cent of land revenues would be o¢ cially
bound to be spent on immigration, and that the legislative council would
become partially elective. As frictions went on, concessions were made again
in 1846 and 1848. Eventually, in 1851 the legislative council issued a formal
"Declaration, Protest and Remonstrance" where it said that "the imperial
Parliament should not continue to tax the people of the colony", that all
"O¢ ces of trust and emolument, except for the Governorship, should be
under local patronage" and that "plenary power of legislation should be
exercised by the Colonial Legislature". Soon after that, "a revolution in
colonial o¢ ce thinking" occurred as the new colonial secretary, Sir Pakington,
seemed to "... have felt that resistance to growing colonial pressures might
ultimately produce more mischief than the abandonment of this interest could
cause" (McMinn, 1979, p. 50). At the end of 1852, land revenues were
surrendered, and self-government followed shortly.
Analysis
It is interesting to study how the loss by Britain of de jure political
power in Australia was matched by the evolution of the British and European
market for wool.
As explained above, the export of wool from Australia increased rapidly in
1830-1870. All of this wool was sent to London, where the main international
market for raw wool was located.
But how much of this wool was retained for consumption in Britain,
and how much was re-exported? Throughout the 1830s, the British market
was the only market for the Australians: in 1840, 99 per cent of British wool
imports were retained for domestic consumption. In the 1840s things became
to change: by 1850, around 20 per cent of British imports were re-exported
to continental Europe. After 1850, a boom in wool consumption by France
and, later, Germany, increased re-export continuously to represent 40 per
cent of the total by 1870.
48The colonists wanted immigration as the pastoral boom had led to a labour shortage.
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As Britain exported an increasing share of its colonial wool imports to the
world outside the Empire, the net wool exports from the world outside the
Empire were falling dramatically. Figure 2 plots this series as a three-year
moving average. It clearly shows that the world outside the British Empire
turned from being a large net exporter of wool to being a large net importer
in the mid 1850s.
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Figure 2
It would be nice to have data on national production and consumption
of wool for the period 1830-1870. Unfortunately, these data can be obtained
(indirectly, through trade data) only for colonial economies that exported
almost all of their wool production. One major trend that seems to stand out
in the existing data, however, is the increase in consumption by continental
Europe and especially France relative to Britain. While Britain was, in the
rst half of the century, by far the largest consumer of wool, in 1860-1864
total consumption of wool in France was 239 M lb against 251 M lb in Britain,
and these numbers were 319 M lb and 251 M lb by the second half of the
1860s.
These gures are consistent with one broad trend in the European wool
textile industry: the catching up of a few countries of continental Europe (and
especially France) vis-à-vis Britain. In the words of Barnard (1958), from
the middle of the century the growth of these Continental industries most
probably implied an increase in the world demand for raw wool. [...] These
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Continental countries exerted, therefore, a growing force in the international
raw wool markets(p. 33). And referring to the catching up of the French
worsted industry in particular, the course of technological development [...]
paralleled that of Britain, though the initial moves occurred a little later. In
the forties most wool combing was done by hand. At the end of that decade
machines [...] were beginning to displace handwork, and in the rst half of
the fties the industry was revolutionized by their wide-scale adoption(p.
28).
These discussion points out that, in fact, the endowments to which the
Australia trade was attracted (the capital of the wool textile industry) were
relocating, in relative terms, outside of the British Empire. This is likely to
have increased the bargaining power of the Australian colonists who knew
that, had they decided to repudiate British authority and had Britain put
some sort of sanction against them, they would have been able to obtain a
better access to European markets than ever before. Just like in the case
of Canada, this increased bargaining power was matched by increasing con-
cessions made by the British, until a point when it made no sense to insist.
As Mc Minn (1979) has pointed out, the decision to concede self-government
can be seen "as a corollary of the decision on land" (Mc Minn, 1979, p. 50).
Arguably, after land revenues were surrendered under the new political con-
ditions, controlling public policy in Australia had no economic return for the
British.
5 Conclusions
I have studied how the sustainability of colonial power depends on the struc-
ture of trade between a colony, her colonizer and the rest of the world. Focus-
ing on factor endowments as the economic force which shapes the pattern of
trade, I have developed a model which links the colonistsprivate incentives
to rebellion to the distribution of world factor endowments. In particular, as
the factor endowments to which colonial trade is attracted become more con-
centrated outside of the empire, rebellion becomes more appealing. This, in
turn, reduces the capacity of the colonizer to extract wealth from the colony,
and increases the likelihood that independence has to be granted.
I have studied whether my model can help interpret two of the three big
episodes of decolonization in modern history: the fall of the Spanish Empire,
and the advancement of most British settler colonies to self-government in
19th century. It is traditionally argued that the fall of the Spanish Empire
was brought about by the invasion of Spain by Napoleon. My model suggests
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that one economic factor which underpinned this causality was the increasing
concentration of manufacturing capital outside of the Spanish Empire, due to
the industrial revolution. My model also helps understand the uctuations in
the strength of Spanish imperial authority over a much longer period of time
(1550-1810). As for British settler colonies, I argue that one economic factor
which induced Britain to concede self-government to Canada and Australia
was, respectively, the accumulation of timber-processing capital in the United
States and wool-processing capital in continental Europe.
These ndings have important implications for the debate on the eco-
nomic legacy of colonialism. On one hand, my results suggest that some of
the most successful European economies may have become so because of a
virtuous circle between colonialism and factor accumulation. As Acemoglu,
Johnson and Robinson (2005) have pointed out, the opening of Atlantic trade
in 16th century a¤ected the countries involved in di¤erent ways: while coun-
tries such as Spain and Portugal depleted the wealth of colonial trade in
public and private consumption, England used it to improve private incen-
tives to capital accumulation. My paper suggests that a more rapid capital
accumulation in England was, in turn, at the base of her unmatched ca-
pacity as colonizer, and therefore her capacity to keep colonial trade highly
protable.
On the other hand, the paper suggests that to understand the actions
that shaped the economic legacy of colonialism, one should keep in mind that
colonial investment and capital accumulation may have an adverse e¤ect on
the protability and sustainability of colonial power. In fact, by showing
that a higher complementarity between colonial and imperial factor endow-
ments may boost extraction and make colonial power more persistent, this
paper provides some new theoretical underpinnings to the argument made
by dependency theorists (see, for example, Frank, 1971) according to which
colonizers deliberately hindered capital accumulation in colonies.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the rst paper to spell out the link
between factor accumulation, trade, and institutional change in international
relations. It does so by constructing a model that, because of its simplicity,
can be generalized and extended. For example, one could write a general
version of the model where the actual source of comparative advantage is
not specied: this would broaden the scope for analysis of the sustainability
of colonial power to changing technology, transport costs, etc. Also, one may
want to use an extended version of the model to study how equilibrium trade
policy is inuenced by international relations. Finally, one could enrich the
political model to account for either heterogeneous colonial agents (and the
possibility that decolonization a¤ects post-independence politics) or interna-
tional investors and their role in inducing governments to decolonize. These,
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and other interesting issues, remain for future research.
6 Appendix
Trade preferences when  2 (;1) - The starting point is to realize that
+
3
> 
2
,  2 (; 2). Thus, for H and E, if  2 (; 2) we have:
f; F; Eg H fH;F; g H fH; ; Eg H fH;F;Eg
fH;F; g E f; F; Eg E fH;F;Eg E fH; ; Eg
If, instead,  2 (2;1):
f; F; Eg H f; H; Fg H fH;F;Eg H fH; ; Eg
fH;F; g E f; F; Eg E fH; ; Eg E fH;F;Wg
For country F , there exist a  () 2 (2;1) such that if  2 (;  ()):
fH;F;Eg ; f; F; Eg F fH;F; g
If, instead,  2 ( () ;1):
fH;F;Eg ; fH;F; g F f; F; Eg
The properties of  () can be inferred by analogy from the properties of
 (), to which I now turn.
Properties of  () - Using equations 3 and 7,  () is found by solving:
 () = arg

vE

K

1 +

2

= vE

K

1 +
 + 
2

=
1
6
+
1
6
p
16+ 2 + 16  2
3
It is easy to see that @
()
@
> 0; let us now show that  () < 
2
. Consider
the properties of 
()

:
 ()

=
1
6

+
p
2 + 16+ 16  4

It is easy to check that 
()

= 1
2
when  = 0; furthermore, it is possible to
check that @ 
()

=@ is negative 8 > 0. 
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Proof of Proposition 1 - In order to keep the exposition simple and
meaningful, I am only focusing on equilibria in which countries do not make
unilateral trade attempts. The fact that T FH = 0 implies that there are only
three possible equilibria: fH; ; Eg, fH;F;Eg and one equilibrium of the
type fH;F;Eg in which both H and F trade with E. As both H and F see
autarchy as the worst possible scenario, the equilibrium will depend entirely
on the preferences of E. Thus, the equilibrium will be fH;F;Eg when  2 
0; 
2

, fH; ; Eg when  2  
2
; 2

and fH;F;Eg when  2 (2;1).
Proof of Proposition 3 - Let us focus, rst, on the case of colonialism.
Given that F sets trade policy for H, there are only two players in this game.
The key is to realize that F is the residual claimant to Hs wealth, and as
such chooses trade policy to maximise the joint utility 	:
	  vF pF (Tj; )+ vH pH (Tj; )
To prove that the no equilibrium exists outside of the class fH;F;Eg,
note rst that no equilibrium can leave either H or F in autarchy. This is
because trade between H and F would increase both vH

pH (Tj; ) and
vF

pF (Tj; ). Next, we can show that fH;F; g is not an equilibrium, as
opening up to E always increases 	. Use equation 3 to write 	 as a function
of a common price in fH;F; g:
	(p) =
p+K
2p
1
2
+
p+K (1 + )
2p
1
2
= p
1
2 +K

1 +

2

p 
1
2
The rst derivative of 	(p) is:
@	(p)
@p
=
1
2
p 
1
2
"
1  K
 
1 + 
2

p
#
A visual analysis of @	(p)
@p
immediately shows that 	(p) achieves a minimum
at p = K
 
1 + 
2

. Thus, trading with E is protable whenever  6= 
2
.
Within the class fH;F;Eg, it is easy to see that "all countries trading with
all countries" is an equilibrium. This is because the only way E can change
the equilibrium price is by retreating into autarchy, and no alternative trade
outcome is strictly better from Fs point of view.
Next, lets focus on the case of independence. We distinguish two cases,
 2 (0; ) and  2 (;1). In the rst case, no equilibrium can leave either
H or F in autarchy: this is because the two would always agree to trade
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with each other, since this would make them both better o¤. But note that
fH;F; g would not be an equilibrium either: this is because either F (if
 2  0; 
2

) or H (if  2  
2
; 

) would deviate and bilaterally admit E into
trade. Similarly, in the second case, no equilibrium could leave either H or E
in autarchy (they would agree to trade with each other) nor would fH; ; Eg
be an equilibrium.
Again, "all countries trading with all countries" is an equilibrium. The
only price-changing deviation available to individual countries is to retire into
autarchy, which is never optimal to chose. As for two-country coalitions, note
that there exist none that could agree on excluding the third country from
trade, as this would always damage one of its members. 
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